Opting Out of the European Union:Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration by Adler-Nissen, Rebecca
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet







Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Adler-Nissen, R. (2014). Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration.
Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337916
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
1 Introduction
The euro crisis has led scholars, policy-makers, practitioners and the
general public to conclude that the process of European integration has
gone off course. Europe’s crisis appears to be at a Titanic moment,
which threatens to bring down not only the EU’s major economies but
also its political raison d’être. ‘The future of the euro is inseparable from
European unity,’ said German Chancellor AngelaMerkel in her address
to the German Parliament in December 2011. At this point, Merkel
received support to amend EU treaties to tackle the debt crisis that had
shaken Europe and threatened the future of the common currency.
Two years later, the EU suffered a damaging split when British Prime
Minister David Cameron promised British voters a choice – to exit
the EU or to negotiate a looser relationship with it. The question
echoing across Europe was: what if the attempts to take back sover-
eignty represent the end of one of the most signiﬁcant Western political
projects since the Second World War?
As the EU has moved into areas that were exclusive to the nation-
state, such as government budget-making, criminal law and border
control, the image of a quasi-automatic integration process has appeared
more frequently in public debates across Europe. During the past two
decades, doubts over the beneﬁts of EU membership have led to some
member states opting out from EU treaties, indicating a preference for
‘outsiderness’ over full membership of the EU. During the Lisbon Treaty
negotiations, the UK, Poland and the Czech Republic secured exemp-
tions from the Charter of Fundamental Rights.1 Their exemptions are
recent examples of a general trend of states formally securing national
1 Polandwas particularly keen to ensure that the Charter of Fundamental Rights did
not affect national legislation in the sphere of public morality and family law; the
UK was particularly concerned that social and economic rights were included in
the same document as civil and political rights; the Czech Republic wanted
guarantees that the charter did not expand the competence of the EU (Barnard
2010).
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sovereignty through instruments of differentiation. Differentiation is
the collective term for rejecting common rules and moving towards a
form of co-operation where various member states have different rights
and obligations within speciﬁc policy areas (Kölliker 2006: 2). National
opt-outs and other instruments of differentiation are likely to be used
much more as the EU expands geographically, continues to introduce
new policies and struggles with eurosceptic populations.
Former Belgium Prime Minister and MEP Guy Verhofstadt did not
mince his words when he said: ‘In actual fact, opt-outs constitute a de
facto negation of the idea of European cooperation’ (Verhofstadt 2006:
214). Is he correct, are opt-outs a ‘negation of the idea of European
cooperation’? Or are they a pragmatic way of integrating states – a
testimony to the sui generis nature of the EU?
Opt-outs are highly politicised and surrounded bymyths. Eurosceptic
politicians and media claim that opt-outs protect national sovereignty
and can be used as an example to other member states (Giddings 2004:
158; Baker 2001). In contrast, pro-European ministers argue that they
lose political inﬂuence when they ‘are shown the door’ at Council of
Ministers meetings because of the opt-outs (Burkitt and Mullen 2003).
As a result, national opt-outs are generally perceived to be controversial,
leading to a dangerous fragmentation of the EU. At the same time, opt-
outs represent the conviction that it is possible to (re)constitute the
boundary of the state in the face of European integration. They draw
a symbolic, legal and political line in the sand to establish an area where
the state should remain sovereign.
When the Maastricht Treaty (1992) granted the UK and Denmark
opt-outs from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), EU lawyers argued that it
would lead to a ‘Europe in bits and pieces’ (Curtin 1993; Weiler 1999),
and political scientists predicted a destructive fragmentation of the EU
(see Andersen and Sitter 2006). Existing research largely interprets opt-
outs from EU treaties as a way to preserve member state sovereignty
(Wallace 1997; Moravcsik 1998; Risse 2002). However, the consequen-
ces of opting out for the individual member states and the European
integration process have yet to be fully explored.
This book has two aims. Empirically, it provides a deeper under-
standing of the EU as a political project. Using national opt-outs as a
lens, it analyses European integration as a member state-driven process,
which at the same time transforms the member states. It challenges the
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claim that opt-outs lead to the marginalisation of certain member states
and contribute to European disintegration. The book looks at the most
controversial form of differentiated integration: the British and Danish
opt-outs from the EMU and borders, asylum, migration and justice
policies. Thus the analysis covers two of the most important and
dynamic policy areas in the EU. More speciﬁcally, it analyses how opt-
outs contribute to labelling British and Danish ofﬁcials as certain types
of ‘players’ in the EU’s Council of Ministers, the primary diplomatic
forum for interstate bargaining in Europe where ministers and ofﬁcials
from the 28 member states negotiate.
Based on this in-depth analysis, I propose a different interpretation:
opt-outs may actually reinforce the integration process. The reason for
this counterintuitive dynamic is to be found in the diplomatic handling
of the controversial sovereignty claims. In fact, the everyday manage-
ment of opt-outs signals a retreat from national sovereignty rather
than an expression of it. As this book shows, sovereignty claims, such
as those made as part of the British and Danish opt-outs, become a
‘stigma’ – a discrediting mark on national representatives. Overall, the
comparative analysis illustrates that direct sovereignty claims are con-
sidered inappropriate in Brussels. In areas where the UK and Denmark
have opted out, their countries are perceived as unorthodox or even as
threats to the EU’s cohesion. The coping strategies used by British and
Danish ofﬁcials reveal that the EU is partially created through the
stigmatisation of transgressive states.
Theoretically, this book develops a political sociology of European
integration. As such it seeks to contribute to the so-called practice or
sociological turn in EU and IR studies by offering a new interpretation
of European integration as an everyday social process. This process is
largely driven by a group of unelected national ofﬁcials who meet to
negotiate in Brussels in relative isolation from domestic populations.
The book develops an approach to analysing the practices, group
pressures and identity constructions inside the EU’s Council of
Ministers. This leads to a new understanding of how power relations
play out between the member states.
More generally, the book demonstrates how insights from the soci-
ology and anthropology of Pierre Bourdieu and Erving Goffman can
be combined. Their work in combination creates a dynamic under-
standing of the disciplining and exclusionary practices that uphold
the EU as a political order – and ways in which this order can be
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successfully challenged. This makes it possible to address an important
(yet neglected) aspect of the ongoing struggle to produce an author-
itative interpretation of European integration and what it takes to be a
(good) member state.
European integration is a radical process. Over the years the EU has
changed what it means to be a European state. As this book illustrates, a
political sociological approach to integration provides a different and
more detailed account of the consequences of European integration for
national sovereignty than the dominant theories of ‘liberal intergovern-
mentalism’ (Moravcsik 1998), ‘multi-level governance’ (Marks 1998),
‘accumulated executive order’ (Curtin and Egebjerg 2008), ‘European
Administrative Space’ (Hoffman 2011; Olsen 2009) or ‘post-sovereignty’
(Keating 2004), which all prioritise formal institutions over social
processes. This book challenges these conventional explanations and
argues that European integration is driven by a body of national repre-
sentatives struggling to position their nations in diplomatic settings.
European integration is neither the result of promoting domestically
deﬁned preferences (Moravscik 2004; Pollack 2010) nor merely the
outcome of multilevel governance. By examining how sovereignty claims
are managed in practice, the book draws attention to the ﬁner points of
day-to-day European integration, such as diplomatic negotiations. This
iswherewe encounterwhat is otherwise an entirely abstract phenomenon,
reiﬁed with the label ‘the state’.
The book shows that a ‘late sovereign diplomacy’ grows out of
day-to-day negotiations in the Council of Ministers and its hundreds
of working groups. Leading political forces in the European states now
see their nations as so deeply rooted within the supranational institu-
tions of the EU that they blur their national interests with those of
the EU. Political and legal authorities overlap, territorial exclusivity is
replaced by functional boundaries and states begin to speak with one
voice. As a result of over 50 years of painstaking work by ofﬁcials from
the European states, a social ﬁeld has developed – an autonomous social
system comprising a pattern of practices and shared meanings, where
certain rules and roles result in competent action. An analysis of this
ﬁeld, its logic and the way in which states are punished for breaching its
tacit rules provides a deeper insight into the diplomatic handling of
the political, economic and social crises – as well as the stability of the
European integration project. The EU is a fragile organisation main-
tained by une certaine idée about Europe, which requires constant care
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and attention from member states. This is why national diplomacy is so
crucial to European integration.
Opting out to safeguard sovereignty
This book focuses on how the British and Danish opt-outs from the
euro, common borders and Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
(AFSJ) are managed. The proliferation of British opt-outs has contrib-
uted to the image of the UK as the ‘awkward partner’ (George 1994;
Rosamond 2004; Geddes 2013) and a ‘stranger in Europe’ (Wall 2008).
Because of the UK’s opt-outs, observers underline the ‘paradoxes’ and
‘tensions’ in Danish EU policy (Kelstrup 2006;Miles 2005b). This book
examines what lies behind these labels.
With the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the EU pressed forward with its
ambitious plans to create a common currency, eliminate national border
controls, introduce common asylum and immigration policies, and
establish EU citizenship and a common foreign policy. Two states –
the UK andDenmark –were particularly reluctant to surrender authority
in these areas and this almost destroyed the treaty. The domestic political
debates in both the UK and Denmark revolved around national identity
being undermined, and control over daily lives and money being sur-
rendered to faceless foreign bureaucrats. In the UK, ‘Maastricht’ became
synonymous with the creation of a federal superstate and generated
‘the longest lasting and arguably the deepest’ division over the UK’s
relationship with Europe since the Second World War (Baker and
Seawright 1998: 2). In Denmark, a range of speciﬁc issues were grouped
under the banner of sovereignty, including the fear of an army of federal
armed forces; the presence of foreign police ofﬁcers on Danish
soil; the application of EU law to sensitive questions of criminal justice;
a common currency; the perception of a self-amending treaty; and
the enhanced role of the European Parliament and EU citizenship
(Hansen 2002).
To prevent the UK fromblocking theMaastricht Treaty, it was granted
opt-out clauses, which meant that it did not have to participate in the
third stage of the EMU and the Social Chapter. These two Maastricht
innovations had been the most controversial for the UK. Even then,
parliamentary ratiﬁcation was challenged by the opposition Labour
and Liberal Democrat MPs, and crucially by the ‘Maastricht Rebels’
within the governing Conservative Party (Ludlam 1998: 33ff). The long
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and agitated debates about the Maastricht Treaty in Westminster
revealed a bitterly divided political landscape. Parliamentarians were
arguing over a treaty that they thought would impact not just on the
British position in the global political economy but also on ‘the very
sovereignty of the British nation’ (Baker et al. 1995: 53). As part of
the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the UK was given an opt-out from the
Schengen agreement (abolishing controls and checks at national bor-
ders between EU member states) and the possibility of opting in to Title
IV TEC (Treaty establishing the European Community) dealing with
‘visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement
of persons. Apart from these treaty opt-outs, the UK has been granted
exemptions from secondary legislation, most famously perhaps by opt-
ing out of the working time directive (Barnard et al. 2003). As Gifford
concludes, ‘Clearly, the principle of opt outs and “red lines” in
European negotiations has become enshrined as the British way of
dealing with the EU’ (Gifford 2010: 326).
Denmark was also a reluctant negotiator in Maastricht. However,
when it was granted a protocol on the EMU, the Danish government
accepted the treaty. At the political level, a broad consensus was estab-
lished between the government parties (Conservatives, Liberals and
Social Liberals) and the Social Democratic Party over the Maastricht
process. Against this backdrop the Danish Parliament voted over-
whelmingly for the Maastricht Treaty in the spring of 1992. However,
this was followed by the unexpected rejection by the Danish population
in a referendum in June 1992. The Danish nej (and the narrow French
oui)2 came as a shock to EU leaders and led to a dramatic ratiﬁcation
crisis. It was clear that the European populations no longer just accepted
or ignored integration. As Lord notes, ‘More than any other single
event, it was the crisis in 1992–3, provoked by the ratiﬁcation of the
Maastricht Treaty onEuropeanUnion (TEU),which shattered any illusion
that the legitimising of EU powerwas a “non-problem”’ (Lord 2000: 4).
In Weiler’s words, the Maastricht crisis was ‘the beginning or end of a
deeper process of mutation in public ethos or societal self-understanding’
(Weiler 1999: 3). Whether or not one accepts the rejection and ratiﬁca-
tion crisis of theMaastricht Treaty as a ‘constitutional moment’ (Weiler
2 Despite expectations of a landslide, the French public barely approved the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992; voters were largely concerned about the sovereignty of
France (Lewis-Beck 2007).
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1999: 3), the so-called permissive consensus appeared to be a thing of
the past.
Following the Danish referendum in June 1992, the Social Democrats,
together with a majority in the Parliament, demanded signiﬁcant revi-
sions in the form of exemptions, which wouldmake the treaty acceptable
to the public in another referendum. These elements constituted the
so-called ‘National Compromise’, which the government had to accept
in October 1992.3 In December 1992 the four demands of the National
Compromise were accepted by the European Council in the ‘Edinburgh
Decision’. The decision focused on the main topic in the Danish refer-
endum debate: the transfer of national sovereignty to the EU. Four key
opt-outs were attached to the treaty: Denmarkwould not adopt the euro;
European citizenship would not replace national citizenship; Denmark
would not participate in the development of a common European
defence; and Denmark would not participate in supranational AFSJ
co-operation.
On 18 May 1993, 56.7 per cent of Danes voted ‘yes’ to the four
opt-outs, which meant that Denmark could ratify the Maastricht
Treaty. However, opposition groups argued that the opt-outs were an
illusion and that, even with the Edinburgh Decision, Denmark was on a
slippery slope towards a European federal state. The ‘yes’ vote triggered
riots in Copenhagen, which were considered to be among the worst in
Denmark’s peacetime history. On the night of the second Danish refer-
endum, Danish police shot into a crowd of demonstrators who had
created an ‘EU-Free Zone’ in Nørrebro, a district in the centre of
Copenhagen. At least 11 people were injured in the shooting and the
‘Nørrebro night’ is still a very sensitive issue in Denmark. Memories of
the event have left Danish police suffering from a traumatic ‘Vietnam
syndrome’ (Scharling 2003).4
3 The National Compromise could ‘unite the population on Denmark’s continued
participation in the EC’. In the document, the ‘no’ is carefully interpreted
as a rejection of the ‘United States of Europe’, but not as a rejection of
European Communities (EC) membership or European co-operation. With this
interpretation the agreement created a united Danish people, to be
politically represented in the opt-outs and to legitimise continued EU membership
(<www.euo.dk/dokumenter/traktat/eu/nationalkompromis/> Adopted by all
parties in Parliament with the exception of the Progress Party, 27 October 1992,
author’s translation).
4 See the ofﬁcial report published on 18 May 1993 entitled Beretning i henhold til
lov nr. 389 af 22. maj 1996 om undersøgelse af Nørrebrosagen (‘Report pursuant
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The sharp contrast between outraged anti-EU demonstrators in the
streets of Copenhagen and more pragmatic governments negotiating in
the glass-and-steel buildings in the Quartier Européen of Brussels show
how sensitive opt-outs can be. These two images reveal a mental and
physical gulf between large segments of the European populations
who are attached to various concepts of national sovereignty and a
Europeanised body of politico-administrative elites in Brussels who are
focused on securing a strategically advantageous position for their
country in Brussels.
While British and Danish governments may point out the detrimental
effects of opt-outs on their country’s position in the EU, they still have to
guarantee to their citizens that they respect the protocols. In the UK and
Denmark, the opt-outs are interpreted as bulwarks against European
integration and symbolise the preservation of national sovereignty –
emphasising an image of the state with full political and legal authority
over people, territory and currency – which makes them seem almost
sacrosanct. As a result, during the Constitutional Treaty negotiations,
the British government said that the opt-outs would not be touched by
what former Secretary of State Jack Straw called a ‘simple tidying-up
exercise’ (Church and Phinnemore 2006: 8). Likewise, Danish Prime
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen promised that the opt-outs would be
safeguarded and that the Danish people would remain in full control:
There will be no trickery. There will be no cherry picking. The opt-outs will
stand clear and clean in the new treaty. And the Danish people shall decide on
this treaty including the opt-outs. (Rasmussen 2003)
Domestically, opt-outs produce a ﬁction of national unity and fabricate
a united domestic public despite apparent political disagreements over
the EU issue. As such, the opt-outs do not just deﬁne a relationship
between the state and the EU but also mediate between different domes-
tic sub-audiences. Elsewhere I have looked at how opt-outs as a claim to
sovereignty are constantly reconﬁgured by government representatives
who present different ‘truths’ about the opt-outs to the domestic and the
European audience, respectively, leading to ‘organized duplicity’ (Adler-
Nissen 2008a). In this book I will focus primarily on the Brussels scene
and less on the domestic scene. While domestic politics is crucial to why
the UK andDenmark opted out, it – surprisingly perhaps – plays a lesser
to act no. 389 of 22May 1996 on the investigation of the Nørrebro case’) and the
special issue of the magazine Dansk Politi (‘Danish Police’) (2003, no. 5).
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role in the everyday management of the opt-outs in the Council of
Ministers.
Opt-outs raise controversial questions about the degree of solidarity
between member states and the political, legal, social and philosophical
limits to European integration. In seemingly tedious treaty protocols,
politicians (and ordinary citizens) have invested a lot of energy in
discussing sovereignty, identity and democracy. So the image of an
autonomous state is sought and preserved at home via the opt-out,
despite the state’s continuous entanglement in the European integration
process. On the European scene, the opt-outs change from being a
principled stance against more integration to a more ﬂexible position,
which allows ministers and diplomats to choose from the buffet of new
EU initiatives. As such, opt-outs, and the diplomatic strategies sur-
rounding them, serve as a prism for understanding the transformation
of sovereignty in the EU.
A crucial case of differentiation
The British and Danish opt-outs are seen as the most controversial and
high-proﬁle protocols in the EU. A continuum of opt-outs exists, rang-
ing from heavily debated policy areas, such as the EMU, Schengen and
the common security and defence policy, to relatively uncontroversial
protocols on reindeer husbandry in Finland and Sweden, the acquisition
of second homes in Malta (and Denmark) and Swedish chewing
tobacco (snus). Speciﬁc derogations at primary law level in favour of
some member states are not a new phenomenon (Hanf 2001: 7), but
most of these protocols have a limited effect and do not threaten the
cohesion of the EU.5
Contrary to protocols with minor opt-outs or transition periods, on,
for example, the freemovement of people when a new state joins the EU,
a number of member states have been granted permanent opt-outs in
the last two decades, which have had extensive consequences. Apart
from the UK and Denmark, Ireland is the only member state with major
exemptions from ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’; however, so far
Ireland mainly follows the UK and will not be considered further in
5 Germany’s ‘Banana Protocol’, attached to the Rome Treaty (1957), which allowed
duty-free access for Central and Latin American bananas into Germany, was also
controversial (see Alter and Meunier 2006).
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this book.6 Sweden has a de facto opt-out in the EMU (it has thus far
evaded the obligation to join the EMU by failing to satisfy certain
criteria), but only the UK and Denmark have formal opt-outs in this
area. In other words, the UK and Denmark are the current opt-out
champions. Being granted an opt-out is very difﬁcult to achieve, as
newer member states (e.g. Poland and the Czech Republic) and pro-
spective members (e.g. Norway) have experienced. During the latest
enlargement negotiations, the European Commission (on behalf of the
EU) ‘saw it ﬁt to rule out any opt-out possibilities for the candidate
countries. The acquis is one of the most sacred of EU concepts and is
expressly designed to prevent any prospective member of “shopping
around” for its own mix of obligations’ (Tatham 2009: 331–332).7
Opt-outs are an established part of the EU, while ‘enhanced
co-operation’ (where a minimum of nine EU member states can establish
advanced integration or co-operation in an area within EU structures
but without the other members being involved) has only been applied
twice – in the ﬁelds of divorce rules and patents, and it is approved for
the ﬁeld of a ﬁnancial transaction tax. There are also many examples of
breakaway groups of member states that have co-operated more closely
outside the treaties. Usually, however, this co-operation ends up being
codiﬁed in the treaties after some years, as the Schengen and EMU
co-operation illustrate.
In summary, the British and Danish opt-outs appear to ﬂy in the face
of the very idea of an ever closer union. They present us with a most-
likely case: if opt-outs do help to safeguard national sovereignty and
threaten integration as we know it, this is most likely to show in the
British and Danish cases. However, if British and Danish national
exemptions are dissolved, as this book demonstrates, we have reason
6 For an interesting account of how Ireland has been forced to follow the UK in the
AFSJ to save the Common Travel Area, see Meehan (2000a; 2000b) and Laffan
and O’Mahony (2008). Ireland has attached a declaration to the Lisbon Treaty
ensuring that Ireland only participates in EU military operations if there is a UN
mandate and the majority of the Irish Parliament backs the decision (see Hummer
2006). However, compared with the Danish defence opt-out, which ensures that
Denmark does not participate in the military dimensions of the European Defence
and Security Policy, the Irish declaration is much less restrictive.
7 ‘It would therefore appear that only current Member States can successfully argue
for opt-outs from new policy developments; such point appears to be conﬁrmed as
much by the current British, Danish and Swedish opt-outs from the latest stages of
the EMU’ (Tatham 2009: 331–332).
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